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Introduction
The United States Congress is currently debating landmark legislation that would expand
federal standards applicable to managed care products purchased by employer-sponsored health
plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2  The single most
contentious issue in this debate concerns whether state damages remedies should be available for
persons who suffer injuries as a result of the treatment decisions made by managed care companies.
Under current law, the answer to this question turns on whether a court views a plaintiff’s case as
one that involves a “claim for benefits” or as one that challenges the quality of care.  In the former
situation, ERISA preempts (i.e., overrides) all state law remedies; in the latter, federal courts have
determined that ERISA does not preempt the claim and have remanded numerous cases to state
court.  Because an estimated 125 million persons are covered by ERISA health benefit plans,3 this
unanticipated effect of the law on the rights of individuals has been enormous and profound.
Over the past several years, this “quality versus coverage” distinction has resulted in a
diminution of the ERISA defense available to employee health benefit plans.  Yet the distinction still
leaves many types of actions classified as coverage decisions, thereby depriving individuals of
damages remedies where they exist under state law. Several recent ERISA judicial decisions
                                      
1 The Department of Health and Human Services has reviewed and approved policy-related information within
this document, but has not verified the accuracy of data or analysis presented.  The opinions expressed herein
are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), or the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
2 ERISA §501 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq.
3 Peter Jacobson and Scott Pomfret, “ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy,” 283 JAMA 921, 921 (2000).
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involving persons injured by managed care treatment decisions suggest that courts may be on the
verge of adopting yet a new framework for determining when an ERISA managed care case involves
a claim for quality or a claim for coverage.  If this latest line of cases is adopted, then in fact most
ERISA health benefit claims involving the services of managed care companies may in fact be
classifiable as quality claims, thus falling outside the sweep of ERISA preemption.
This Issue Brief, prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, examines the evolution of this framework for analyzing health claims emanating
from the conduct of ERISA-covered managed care arrangements and considers its implications for
the provision of treatment for mental illness and addiction disorders.  Both studies and anecdotal
evidence suggest that managed care companies impose particularly rigorous controls over treatment
for mental illness and addiction disorders.4  It is therefore perhaps not surprising that legal
challenges to treatment decisions frequently involve individuals with these conditions.
Consequently, to the extent that courts are in fact on the verge of re-conceptualizing their approach
to analyzing managed care cases under ERISA, the implications for treatment of mental illness and
addiction disorders may be especially significant.
This Issue Brief begins with an overview that examines the coverage- and quality-related
theories of liability that courts have developed over the years in the case of insurers and institutional
health care providers and reviews their application to the managed care industry.  The Issue Brief
next considers the effect of ERISA on the application of these theories to managed care products
furnished through ERISA-sponsored employee benefit plans.  Part three examines recent court
decisions that may signal a basic shift in judicial theory in the area of quality versus coverage.  We
conclude with a discussion of what this shift means for individuals covered by ERISA plans, as well
as for the health care system as a whole.
It should be noted at the outset that this area of the law is in an extreme state of flux and
thus policy could shift once again, especially if legislation pending in Congress alters ERISA
preemption or the legal framework for determining the coverage/quality distinction.  Nonetheless,
the question whether managed care companies can or should be liable for damages for death and
injuries sustained as a result of negligent or wrongful treatment decisions on their part is one that
appears to resonate deeply with Americans (including employers themselves, according to at least
one study).5  Thus, it is likely that the  “ERISA shield” against liability in managed care treatment
cases will continue to erode.
                                      
4 See, e.g., “Behavioral Health Benefits in Employer-Sponsored Health Plans, 1997,” 18:2 Health Affairs 67-78
(Mar./Apr. 1999).  In this regard it is also worth noting that in the fall of 1999, when United Health Care announced its
intention to permit network physicians to make independent decisions regarding the medical necessity of care, it was
careful to exempt from this new policy decisions involving treatment for mental illness.  M. Freudenheim, “Big HMO to
Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors,” N.Y. Times, November 9, 1999 at A1.
5 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits (Menlo Park, CA, 1999).
In this study, 61% of all small firms, the majority of firms in nearly all regions of the country, and the majority of nearly
all firms by industry type favored consumer protections including the right to be able to sue health plans for malpractice.
Exhibit 15.6, p. 156.
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Part 1. Overview: The Liability of Managed Care Companies Under State Law
The modern managed care system represents a hybrid of health insurance and health care.
In their contracts, managed care companies of all types and at all levels in the contracting process6
sell health care, rather than simple health coverage.  Members of managed care plans, whether
loosely organized or tightly managed,7 are either encouraged or required to obtain their health care
from a network of providers whose selection, compensation, and (to a greater or lesser degree)
treatment decision-making8 all are subject to the control of a corporate entity and its agents. In
essence, therefore, managed care represents the sale of health care for a preset fee, with the
purchaser, the managed care company, its provider network, and covered members all sharing in the
financial risks created by the enterprise.
Because managed care is a hybrid corporate model, courts have applied several bodies of law
in deciding managed care liability cases. The two principal bodies of law that have been applied are
the law of insurance coverage, and the law of health care quality.
The law of health insurance coverage and the theory of bad faith breach of contract.  An insurance policy
constitutes a contract between the insurer and the insured.  As with any contract-based action, a
breach of contract by an insurer can result in recovery of foreseeable damages for injuries that flow
from the breach.  In the case of health care, these foreseeable damages could be the cost of the
treatment that was sought as well as compensation for lost work time and other predictable damages
(typically identified as part of the contract itself).
Because of the unequal bargaining relationship between the parties in the case of insurance
agreements (very few Americans, whether insured directly or through an employer, actually sit down
and negotiate the terms of their insurance agreement with a managed care company), courts have
long recognized the high potential for unfair dealing.  As a result, over the past half century
American courts have applied the theory of “bad faith breach of contract”9 to create liability on the
part of health and liability insurers for unfair coverage decisions.  The theory of bad faith breach
applies to situations in which an individual can demonstrate that “an insurer has failed to deal fairly
and in good faith with its insured by refusing without proper cause to compensate its insured for a
loss covered by the policy.”10  Using this theory, plaintiffs can recover not only compensatory
damages but also damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorneys fees.11
                                      
6 A single managed care company may be the prime contractor in one arrangement or a subcontractor in another.  For
example, a Blue Cross company may be a prime contractor for an employer in one case and may sell its network to a
different prime contractor who administers a managed care product for another employer.  See, e.g., Corcoran v United
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F. 2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
7 A loosely organized entity might be a preferred provider organization, which builds a non-exclusive network of
providers who agree to discount the cost of care for members and supervises their activities to only a limited degree.  At
the other extreme is a staff or group model HMO that employs or contracts with its participating physicians and other
health providers on an exclusive basis and maintains strict controls over practice management and utilization of services.
8 Sara Rosenbaum et al., “An Evaluation of Agreements Between Managed Care Organizations and Community-Based
Mental Illness and Addiction Disorder Treatment and Prevention Providers (Second Edition),” (School of Public Health
and Health Services, The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, DC (1999)).
9 See, e.g., Gruenberg v Aetna Insurance Co., 510 P. 2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
10 Id.
11 Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law and the American Health Care System (Foundation Press, 1997;
1999-2000 Supplement), Ch. 2(B).
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In certain jurisdictions managed care entities, specifically HMOs, are not considered to be
insurers and thus cannot be held liable for bad faith breach of contract.  However, in recent years
courts have begun to apply the common law tort of bad faith to managed care organizations for the
wrongful denial of coverage.  In McEvoy v Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire,12 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court concluded that an HMO could be found liable for injuries caused by its injurious
out-of-network benefit decisions.  McEvoy involved a decision by a health plan medical director to
terminate treatment for anorexia nervosa that was being furnished by an out-of-network specialty
center in favor of in-network, less intensive treatment.  The termination order was given even
though the patient had not finished the course of treatment and had not achieved the recovery
milestones identified under established treatment protocols, and even though the patient’s treating
physician opposed the termination. The plaintiff, who weighed 95 pounds at the time of discharge,
relapsed almost immediately; when she was finally readmitted she weighed only 74 pounds.  At that
point the family paid for treatment.
Noting that the common law tort of bad faith had existed under Wisconsin law for 20 years,
the court observed that HMOs are “hybrid entities” that when acting as insurers, create a “power
imbalance similar to that between a classical insurer and policyholder.”  Since HMOs in fact hold
licenses to sell insurance and are subject to many of the same regulations that govern traditional (i.e.,
indemnity) insurers, the court concluded that the liability theories applicable to other forms of
insurance should apply here.
The McEvoy court also noted the public policy rationale for extending this theory of liability
to HMOs:
Through contractual arrangements with physicians and patients, HMOs are able to exert significant
influence on, if not outright control over, the costs of treatment regimens * * *.  The fears attendant
with such arrangements, however, revolve around the economic model of health care financiers
focusing on reducing aggregate costs while failing to recognize and to protect adequately the medical
needs of individual subscribers.  This fear is particularly acute in the present high-cost medical
economy where an adverse benefits ruling means not just that the financial will not provide payment,
but also that the medical care itself is effectively denied.13
In distinguishing between in-network and out-of-network decisions, the court noted that in-
network decisions by HMO physicians could be pursued as classic malpractice actions, while in
making an out-of-network decision, the HMO was acting purely as an insurer and thus should be
covered by insurance liability theory.  Other courts appear to follow the McEvoy lead.14
Theories of medical quality liability: vicarious and corporate liability. As noted by the McEvoy court,
managed care organizations also can be viewed as corporate entities that provide health care.  In this
regard, they are analogous from a legal point of view to hospitals, whose liability for the quality of
the health care they furnish has been a tenet of medical malpractice theory for the past 40 years.15
Two separate theories of liability – vicarious liability and corporate negligence – can exist in
the case of corporate health care providers.  Both may be present in the same case.
                                      
12 570 N.W. 2d 397 (Wis. 1997).
13 Id. at 403.
14 See, e.g., Long v Great West Life and Annuity Insurance Co., 957 P. 2d 823 (Wyo. 1998) (insurer may be liable under bad
faith breach theory for unreasonable denials of prior authorization for necessary care).
15 Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 3(E).
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Vicarious liability.  Under the theory of vicarious liability, a provider may be held liable for
the acts of its agents.  In the case of hospitals, these agents may be physicians with staff privileges,
nurses, and other health providers who work in the facility.  In the case of managed care
organizations, the agents are the network physicians, hospitals and other providers.  The fact that
the relationship between the company and the health professional is non-exclusive and contractual
as opposed to an exclusive contractual or employment relationship does not defeat an agency claim.
For example, in Jackson v Power,16 one of the leading cases on hospital liability law, a hospital was held
vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor emergency room physician.  The
Alaska Supreme Court found that under state licensure law and national accreditation standards, the
hospital had a non-delegable duty to furnish emergency care and thus could be held liable for the
quality of its contractor’s care.
A key in hospital agency theory may be whether the patient picks the health provider, with
vicarious liability limited to situations (such as emergency room physicians, anesthesiologists, or
radiologists) where the hospital effectively supplies the service without choice.17  However, other
courts have held that hospitals can be liable whenever they supply the service, regardless of the
actual level of patient choice.18  Vicarious liability on the part of hospitals turns on the degree of
control they maintain over the work of individual health professionals; even where they maintain no
actual control, hospitals can be liable under “apparent” or “ostensible” agency theory where the
relationship created gives the appearance of control.
In the case of managed care, the basic theories of vicarious liability (i.e., non-delegable duty,
actual agency, and apparent agency) all become relevant.  This is because by virtue of their own sales
contracts, national accreditation standards, and various state and federal laws, managed care
companies appear to maintain relationships with their networks that parallel the type of relationship
that gives rise to a claim of vicarious liability.
In recent years, courts have applied vicarious liability theory to managed care arrangements.
For example, in Boyd v Albert Einstein Medical Center,19 a Pennsylvania state court examined the master
contract between the HMO and its purchasers, which stated that the HMO operated a
“comprehensive prepaid program of health care* * *.”   The HMO contracted with an independent
practice association (IPA) for its physician services; the IPA in turn selected its members, exercised
control over their continued membership in the practice, and paid them from common funds.  The
court found that this evidence could support a claim of vicarious liability against the HMO, given its
operation as a direct service provider rather than an indemnity insurer.  At the same time, other
courts have found similar relationships to lack the level of actual or apparent control necessary to
establish vicarious liability.20
Corporate negligence.  The other theory of liability that governs hospitals and that has been
held to apply to managed care organizations with seemingly increasing frequency is the theory of
                                      
16 743 P. 2d. 1376 (Alaska 1987).
17 See, e.g., Mehlman v Powell, 378 A. 2d 1121 (Md. 1977); Hannola v City of Lakewood, 426 N.E. 2d 1187 (Ohio App. 1980),
and other cases cited in Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 3(E).
18 Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 3(E).
19 547 A. 2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 1988).
20 See, e.g., Chase v Independent Practice Association, Inc., 583 N.E. 2d 251 (Mass. App. 1991).
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corporate negligence.  In the landmark case of Darling v Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,21 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that hospitals, as health care corporations, have a duty, grounded in
licensure law and accreditation standards, to ensure that the services they furnish meet the standard
of care.  Doing so means the use of reasonable care in selecting and overseeing medical and other
health professional staff, and reasonable oversight of the quality of care furnished by the staff.  In a
separate liability case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the corporate theory of liability
would not
be triggered every time something goes wrong in a hospital which harms a patient.  * * * To establish
corporate negligence a plaintiff must show * * * that the hospital itself is breaching a duty and is
somehow substandard.  This requires that the hospital knew or should have known about the breach
of duty that is harming its patients.  Just as regular negligence is measured by a reasonable person
standard, a hospital’s corporate negligence will be measured against what a reasonable hospital under
similar circumstances should have done.22
The notion that corporate health care providers have a direct obligation to patients to select
competent staff and oversee the quality of their practice has gained increasing stature with courts
considering the liability of managed care companies for substandard quality health care furnished by
or through their corporate structures.23
Recent legislative developments: liability for wrongful coverage determinations. In recent years several
states have extended the theory of liability for negligent or wrongful coverage decisions by enacting
laws that give individuals a direct right to sue an insurer for injuries sustained as a result of negligent
or wrongful coverage determinations.   An extension of sorts of the bad faith breach of contract
theory, a negligent coverage statute permits a plaintiff to directly pursue a managed care company in
its capacity of coverage decision-maker, without regard to whether one also can characterize the case as a
quality of care case.   Under such a statute, the negligence can be part of the coverage decision itself,
rather than the actual fact of treatment, a critical distinction in the case of hybrid entities such as
managed care companies.24
In sum, under current law, plaintiffs in liability actions against managed care companies have
two basic types of claims relevant to this Issue Brief: claims of liability that involve companies in
their capacity as insurers and coverage decision-makers; and claims against companies in their capacity as
treatment providers.  One set of facts conceivably could give rise to both types of claims.  Other
theories of liability against managed care companies include theories based on fraud and violations
                                      
21 211 N.E. 2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
22 Edwards v Brandywine Hospital, 652 A. 2d 1382, 1386 (Pa. Super. 1995).
23 See, e.g., Shannon v McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998) (in which the court, directly applying hospital theory,
upheld corporate and vicarious negligence claims in connection with obstetrical related malpractice case) and Petrovitch v
Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to
entitle her to a trial on whether Share Health Plan is vicariously liable under the doctrines of both apparent and implied
authority).
24 The best known of these statutes is Texas Civ. Prac. & Reim §88.01 et seq., which establishes a duty on the part of a
health insurer or HMO or other managed care entity to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions and provides for liability for damages for harm to an insured that is proximately caused by the failure to
exercise ordinary care.
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of other consumer protection statutes,25 theories of public accommodation,26 theories of due process
in the case of publicly purchased managed care plans.27
Part 2. The Effect of ERISA on Managed Care Liability
An Overview of ERISA and ERISA preemption.  ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect the
integrity of employee pensions following a series of scandals related to employer and union fraud
and mismanagement of billions of dollars in private pension payments.28  ERISA applies to all
employers except state and local governments and churches and church-related agencies (unless they
choose to be covered by ERISA), and covers all benefits furnished through “employee benefit
plans” sponsored by employers.29
ERISA is a complex piece of legislation that establishes a substantial number of content
standards in the case of employer pension plans but relatively few in the case of group health plans.
ERISA provides a series of procedural protections for individuals whose claims for benefits are
denied, including the right to a “full and fair hearing” from the employer plan and access to the
courts to enforce their current and future rights under the plan.  Because ERISA is grounded in the
law of trusts,30 individuals who are denied benefits promised by the plan may sue to recover their
benefits and may also recover certain types of “extra-contractual” damages against the plan, such as
injunctive relief.31 However, consistent with the law of trusts (which emphasizes protection of the
trust corpus for all trust beneficiaries and thus protects the corpus from the possibility of large
rewards other than the benefit owed in the case of any individual beneficiary), ERISA does not allow
recovery for money damages.  ERISA “fiduciaries”  (i.e., the employer or entity entrusted with the
administration of the plan) have as their highest duty the protection of trust assets and their use
exclusively for the benefit of plan participants.
The fact that ERISA does not provide for damages as a remedy is not unduly significant in
and of itself.  Indeed, relatively few federal laws provide for the recovery of damages, since this type
of remedy is viewed as the purview of state law and the judge-made common law on which much
state law is grounded.  However, ERISA has been construed by the United States Supreme Court as
preempting virtually any state law that “relates to” an employee benefit plan, even in cases in which
there is no specific provision of ERISA that is in conflict with the particular state law at issue.
This extraordinary level of preemption is known as “field preemption”, meaning that in the
case of ERISA, the federal statute is judged to preempt the entire field of state law relevant to
benefit plan administration, whether or not the state law comes into actual conflict with a provision
of ERISA.  Field preemption is highly unusual. Consistent with a federal legislative scheme (which if
anything has been construed in recent years to limit the powers of Congress in areas of law reserved
                                      
25 See, e.g., Napoletano v Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).
26 Woolfolk v Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
27 See, e.g., Grijalva v Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded 119 U.S. 1573 (1999) (Medicare); J.K. v
Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694 (Medicaid); and Daniels v Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Tenn. 1996) (Medicaid).
28 John Langbein and Bruce Wolk, “Pension and Employee Benefit Law” (2d ed. 1995).
29 29 U.S.C. §1003.
30 Firestone Tire and Rubber v Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
31 29 U.S.C. §1132(g).
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to the states32), most Congressional legislation with preemptive effect is drafted (and subsequently
construed by the courts) to provide only for “conflict preemption”.  Under the theory of conflict
preemption, state law is preempted only where it actually conflicts with a specific provision in the
federal statute.
In the case of ERISA, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the need for
national uniformity in the administration of employee benefit plans is so great that the law must be
construed as one that establishes field preemption.  As a result, any state law that “relates to” an
employee benefit plan is preempted.33  The term “relate to” has been construed as meaning having a
“connection with” or “reference to” the benefit plan; in recent years the Court has narrowed the
range of laws that fall within either the “connection with” or “reference to” category to exempt laws
whose relationship to the administration of employee benefit plans is simply too “tenuous and
remote” or “indirect” to be considered as laws that relate to a plan.34  In recent years the Court has
moved away from a highly “textual”  (i.e., literal) reading of the law’s preemption provisions and
toward a contextual interpretation of the statute as a means of limiting its preemptive effects.
Nonetheless, the reach of the preemption standard is still considerable.
Although ERISA preempts state laws that relate to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans,
it also provides that state laws that regulate banking and insurance are “saved” from preemption.35
This provision would appear to save many state laws that regulate the insurance industry, including
state statutes creating liability for negligent treatment decisions, as well as the common law theory of
bad faith breach of contract.  However, the Supreme Court has further determined that not every
law that regulates the insurance industry is a law that regulates insurance.  The Court has held that in an
ERISA case, it is a question of federal law whether a state law in fact is one that regulates insurance
and thus is saved.36  Generally, in order to be a law that “regulates insurance,” the state law at issue
(whether statutory or judge-made common law) must meet a three-pronged test (although the Court
has loosened this standard a bit during the past year37).  First, it must regulate the relationship
between the insurer and the insured.  Second, it must involve the spreading of risk.  Third, it must
be specific to the insurance industry.  Thus, many laws that apply to insurers nonetheless may not be
“saved” from preemption.38
The application of preemption theory to state laws creating liability for damages against insurers.  The full
meaning of ERISA preemption in the case of individual rights was seen in the landmark Supreme
Court decision of Pilot Life v Dedeaux.39  The Pilot Life case involved an action for bad faith breach of
contract by a man who had been denied his disability benefits under an ERISA-covered disability
                                      
32 See, e.g., Kimel v Florida Bd. Of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) and cases cited therein.
33 ERISA §514(a); 29 U.S.C. §1144(a); Shaw v Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
34 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) and Donovan v
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).
35 ERISA §514(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. §1144(a)(2).
36 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 721 (1985).
37 See Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v Ward, 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999), in which the Supreme Court upheld California’s
“notice prejudice” law that prohibits insurers from denying claims that were not filed in a timely fashion unless they
could prove that the lack of timely notice was in some way prejudicial.  The law was upheld even though the “risk-
spreading” prong of the three-pronged test could not literally be said to have been met.
38 See cases cited in Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 2(C).
39 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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pension plan. The plaintiff’s case was based on the Mississippi common law claim of bad faith
breach of contract; the plaintiff argued that the law was saved as a law that regulated insurance.
Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a noted advocate of states’ rights, held
that the common law tort of bad faith breach of contract “related to” ERISA plans and was
therefore preempted, and further that the law was not saved as a law that regulated insurance.  This
latter holding was based on the Court’s conclusion that, as a general tenet of the common law
applicable to many types of contractual arrangements, the Mississippi common law failed to meet
any element of the three-pronged test.
Justice O’Connor stressed that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, which provide for the
recovery of benefits owed but essentially no more, are so integral to the delicate political and
substantive balance achieved by the law that to permit injured individuals to recover damages would
fundamentally undermine the law’s entire scheme.
The civil enforcement scheme of ERISA * * * is one of the essential tools for accomplishing
the stated purpose of ERISA. * * * Under the civil enforcement provisions, a plan participant or
beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits.
Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits,
or an injunction against an administrator’s improper refusal to pay benefits.  A participant or
beneficiary may also bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and under this cause of action
may seek removal of the fiduciary. * * *  The policy choice  reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected in ERISA.
Thus, with the Pilot Life decision, the Court removed the right of over 125 million Americans to
recover damages against insurers offering ERISA-sponsored products for bad coverage decisions.
Nothing in the history surrounding enactment of ERISA indicated that Congress ever contemplated
such a far-reaching result, but the argument in favor of the decision (i.e., the overwhelming need to
protect pension plans from depletion in the face of huge damages actions) was perceived as
sufficiently compelling to scotch all possibility for a reversal of the decision.  The decision not only
removes the bad faith breach of contract claim from the armament of remedies available to injured
parties but in all likelihood renders inapplicable state laws that permit damages for negligent
coverage decisions.40
The extension of Pilot Life to managed care cases.  The first major test of the effect of the Pilot Life
decision on claims against managed care companies brought by beneficiaries enrolled in ERISA-
sponsored health plans came in Corcoran v United Healthcare, Inc.41  The facts of the Corcoran case were
“undisputed” according to the court.  The case involved a woman with a high-risk pregnancy and
experiencing pre-term labor who, despite the standards of care that apply to such cases, was denied
                                      
40 In Corporate Health v Texas Department of Insurance, 12 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tx. 1998), a federal court considered the
application of the Texas liability law (discussed supra) to negligent treatment decisions by ERISA plans, but did not
squarely reach its application to coverage determinations (since the case involved a facial challenge to the statute, the
court was deciding whether under any circumstances the statute could survive a preemption challenge).  Although after
Pilot Life it is really not an open question whether such a law could in fact reach ERISA plans, the court in Corporate
Health found the statute not preempted as applied to insurers and managed care plans merely acting as service providers
to ERISA plans.
41 965 F. 2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
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round-the-clock hospital care over her physician’s objections by the defendant. United, as the
utilization review company, instead prescribed part-time home nursing benefits.  During the evening
hours when the nurse was off duty, the woman went into full labor and lost the baby.
The family sued United Healthcare for wrongful death and negligence under Louisiana law.
The defendants moved to dismiss the claim as preempted.  According to the defendants, the claim
was in essence one to recover benefits owed; as a result, ERISA preempted the Louisiana law
allowing damages for negligent coverage decisions and provided the only avenue by which the family
could seek redress for its alleged injuries.  United argued that it simply made a benefit determination,
not a medical decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed.  Citing Pilot Life, the court
determined the case involved a claim for benefits and held that the plaintiff’s only remedies could be
found in ERISA itself, and that Louisiana law was preempted.  Holding that United made “medical
decisions incident to benefit determinations,” the court acknowledged the important difference
between traditional insurance decisions in retrospective denial cases and the impact of such
decisions in an era of managed care:
United argues that the decision it makes in * * * the prospective context is no different than
the decision an insurer makes in the traditional retrospective context.  The question in each case is
what the medical plan will pay for, based on a review of [the beneficiary’s] clinical information and
nationally accepted guidelines for the treatment of * * the condition. * * *  A prospective decision is,
however, different in its impact on the beneficiary than a retrospective decision.  In both systems, the
beneficiary theoretically knows in advance what treatments the plan will pay for, because coverage is
spelled out in the plan documents.  But in the retrospective system, a beneficiary who embarks on the
course of treatment recommended by his or her physician has only a potential risk of disallowance or
all or a part of the cost of that treatment and then only after treatment has been rendered.  In
contrast, in a prospective system a beneficiary may be squarely presented in advance of treatment with
a statement that the insurer will not pay for the proposed course of treatment and the beneficiary has
the potential of recovering the cost of that treatment only if he or she can prevail in a challenge to the
insurer’s decision.  A beneficiary in the later system would be far less inclined to undertake the course
of treatment that the insurer has at least preliminarily rejected.  By its very nature a system or
prospective decisionmaking influences the beneficiary's’ choice of treatment options to a far greater
degree * * * .  Indeed, the perception among insurers that prospective determinations result in lower
health are costs is premised on the likelihood that a beneficiary, faced with the knowledge of
specifically what the plan will and will not pay for, will choose the treatment option recommended by
the plan * * * .  When United makes a medial decision * * * it is making a medical recommendation
which – because of the financial ramifications – is more likely to be followed. * * *
The acknowledged absence of a remedy under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme for
medical malpractice committed in connection with a plan benefit determination does not alter our
conclusion.  While we are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause
leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans the
lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis. * * *  Congress could not have
predicted the interjection into the ERISA “system” of the medical utilization review process, but it
enacted a pre-emption clause so broad and a statute so comprehensive that it would be incompatible
with the language, structure and purpose of the statute to allow tort suits against entities so integrally
connected with a plan.42
                                      
42 Corcoran, 965 F. 2d at 1333-34.
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Other courts followed the lead of the Corcoran court and held that ERISA preempted claims
against managed care companies when performing prospective utilization review decisions, because
such claims were in reality claims for benefits and thus subject to the exclusive remedies allowed in
ERISA.  In one particularly compelling case that yielded a written protest from the trial judge, the
negligent coverage decisions made by a health plan was alleged to have led to the suicide of a man
who was allegedly discharged prematurely from inpatient care for alcoholism and mental illness.43
Numerous other decisions rejecting damages actions against managed care companies that, in
administering ERISA plans made negligent or wrongful treatment decisions in the course of
utilization review, rapidly mounted across the country.44
The Dukes case and the quality/coverage distinction.  In 1995, three years after the Corcoran ruling,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision that established a crucial
limitation on the application of ERISA preemption theory to claims involving medical injuries.
Dukes v U.S. Healthcare, Inc.45 involved claims for both vicarious and corporate negligence brought
against the health care company and its participating hospitals and physicians.  In the case the
decedent failed to receive from both his physician and a participating hospital timely care that would
have identified extremely high levels of blood sugar that led to his death. The widow filed a
malpractice action against the plan and its network hospitals and facilities.  The defendants
“removed” the case to federal court under federal procedural rules and the trial court dismissed the
claims as in essence claims for benefits subject to the limited remedies of ERISA.
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that claims alleging medical malpractice by health care
providers involve challenges to the quality of care, rather than claims for benefits.  Because quality of care
cases do not involve claims for benefits, they do not “arise under” ERISA and thus are not
preempted:
Nothing in the [complaint] indicates that plaintiffs are complaining about their ERISA
welfare plans’ failure to provide benefits due under the plan * * *.  [T]he plaintiffs * * * complain
about the low quality of the medical treatment they actually received and argue that U.S. Healthcare
HMO should be held liable under agency and negligence principles. * * * [A] claim about the quality
of a benefit received is not a claim * * * ‘to recover benefits due’ * * * under the terms of [the] plan.
We recognize that the distinction between the quantity of benefits due under a welfare plan
and the quality of those benefits will not always be clear in situations like this one, where the benefit
contracted for is health care services rather than money to pay for such services.  There well may be
cases in which the quality of a patient’s medical care or the skills of the personnel provided to
administer that care will be so low that the treatment received simply will not qualify as health care at
all.  In such a case, it may well be appropriate to conclude that the plan participant or beneficiary has
been denied benefits due under the plan.  This is not such a case, however; while the * * * complaint
alleges that the  * * * hospital committed malpractice when it decided not to perform certain blood
tests, no one would conclude from that malpractice that [the hospital] was not acting as a health care
provider when it made those decisions.
* * [T]he HMO’s argument  * * * is at root a contention that the employer and the HMO impliedly
contracted that the health care services provided would be of acceptable quality and, accordingly, that
these damage suits rest on a failure to provide services of acceptable quality. * * * [W]hile we have no
doubt that all concerned expected the medical services arranged for by the HMOs to be of acceptable
quality, this seems to us beside the point.  The relevant inquiry is not whether there was an
                                      
43 Andrews-Clarke v Travelers Insurance Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
44 See cases cited in Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 3(E).
45 57 F. 3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. den. 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
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expectation of acceptably competent services but rather whether there was an agreement to displace
the quality standard found in otherwise applicable law with a contract standard. * * *
The HMO takes heart in [Corcoran]. * * * Although United’s decisions in Corcoran were in
part medical decisions, United, unlike the HMOs here, did not provide, arrange for, or supervise the
doctors who provided the actual medical treatment.  Instead, United only performed * * * utilization
review.  The difference between “utilization review” and arranging for medical treatment is crucial * *
* because only in a utilization review role is an entity in a position to deny benefits * * * .
In these cases the defendants HMOs play two roles, not just one * * * .  * * * Unlike
Corcoran there is no allegation that the HMOs denied anyone any benefits that they were due under
the plan.  Instead the plaintiffs here are attempting to hold HMOs liable for their role as the arrangers
of their decedents’ medical treatment. * * *46
The Dukes quality/coverage distinction was quickly embraced by courts throughout the
country who understood the analytic framework as a means of averting the seeming injustice of
preempting state remedies for injuries caused by the conduct of managed care companies.
Furthermore, classifying the case as a quality case that is governed by state law results in the remand
of the case back to the state courts from federal court, thereby freeing the federal courts of having
to handle cases that, even if benefit claims, are really battles over the standard of medical care.47
Federal courts—particularly courts that are as overwhelmed by cases as is the current federal court
system—view medical standards cases as the quintessential province of state courts.
In sum, ERISA preemption applies to claims that are for benefits due under the plan, but
not for claims challenging the quality of care.  As the Dukes court pointed out, HMOs wear two
hats: those of insurers and health care providers.  When a claim challenges the conduct of an HMO
in its utilization management capacity, a preemption holding is nearly inevitable.  But to the extent
that the claim involves the quality of care, most federal courts will classify the complaint as not
preempted and will remand the case to state court for a trial on the merits.  This of course does not
mean that the plaintiff wins.  It may turn out that the real issue in the case is a claim for benefits, in
which case the state court must dismiss the action as preempted by ERISA.  It may also turn out
that the claim of malpractice against the HMO cannot be sustained under either corporate or
vicarious negligence theories, for the reasons explored earlier in this Issue Brief.  Furthermore, post-
Dukes/Corcoran cases tend to be a hodgepodge of holdings.  In some cases, the court construes the
complaint as effectively one for benefits; in others, with strikingly similar facts, a court will view the
complaint as one challenging the quality of care.48  Nonetheless, the Dukes case was viewed as a
major victory for plaintiffs because it opened the door to a medical malpractice case against an
HMO whose product is supplied to an ERISA plan.  ERISA preemption of certain state law claims
is summarized in the following figure.
                                      
46 Dukes, 57 F. 3d at 356-61.
47 Sara Rosenbaum, David Frankford, Brad Moore, and Phyllis Borzi, “Who Should Determine When Health Care is
Medically Necessary?,” 340 NEJM 3 (January 21, 1999).
48 See Law and the American Health Care System, op. cit., Ch. 3(E).
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Figure 1. ERISA Preemption of State Law Claims49
Part 3. The Further Blurring of the Coverage/Quality Distinction Post-Dukes : The
Moscovitch and In Re U.S. Healthcare Cases
Two recent decisions underscore the inclination of the courts to view HMOs in their health
care provider capacity when reviewing cases brought by ERISA plan participants.
Moscovitch v Danbury Hospital50 involved a wrongful death action brought by an ERISA
beneficiary following the death of her son.  The facts of the case were as follows: The plaintiff was
enrolled in a medical plan administered by the PHS company as part of an ERISA-covered benefit
plan.  The plaintiff’s son was admitted to Danbury hospital for serious mental illness and then
transferred to Vitam for continued treatment.  The day of his arrival at the second provider, the
plaintiff committed suicide.  The plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligence on the part of the hospital,
the second provider, and the plan administrator.  Specifically, the complaint alleged, among other
matters, that both directly and through its agents Danbury and Vitam, PHS was negligent and failed
to provide the appropriate standard of care.
The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for dismissal of the claims as
claims for benefits that were preempted by ERISA.  The company pointed to the following elements
of the complaint as essentially establishing coverage claims: PHS improperly terminated treatment at
Danbury and transferred the decedent; PHS made improper determinations regarding the type of
treatment the decedent required; and PHS refused to provide inpatient care.
                                      
49 This flowchart is taken from Dean M. Harris, “Healthcare Law and Ethics: Issues for the Age of Managed Care,”
Health Administration Press (Chicago, IL, 1999), p. 292.
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In fact, these claims were strikingly like those in the Corcoran case, which similarly involved
decisions not to hospitalize a patient and instead to order outpatient care.  Nonetheless, the court
refused to dismiss the claims:
Viewing these allegations in context [of the claims against the treating providers Danbury
Hospital and Vitam], however, it is clear that the plaintiff is challenging the appropriateness of the
medical and psychiatric decisions of PHS concerning the care given to the decedent. [The complaint]
does not assert that PHS was making the wrong decisions about whether certain care would be
covered by its plans but instead challenges the decisions made by PHS with respect to the quality and
appropriate level of care and treatment.  For example [the complaint] alleges that PHS failed to
properly diagnose and assess the decedent’s psychiatric condition, failed to properly monitor care and
treat him, failed to properly oversee his treatment, and failed to prescribe and administer appropriate
medication.  Such claims do not fall within the scope of ERISA. * * * The plaintiff here, like the
plaintiff in Dukes, challenges the quality of the medical treatment the decedent allegedly received from
PHS and its agents.
The court * * * recognizes that it is often difficult to determine when an entity such as PHS
is arranging, supervising, or providing the medical treatment of a plan participant * * * or merely
making benefit determinations. * * *  It will be the plaintiff’s burden [at trial] to show that PHS
crossed the line into making such treatment decisions, but he may attempt to do so under state law. *
* * 51
In a 1999 case, the first since it decided the Dukes case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit extended its earlier holding in what may be an extension of its earlier rationale
regarding the “two lives” of HMOs.  In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.52 involved the death of a two-day-old
baby following a 24-hour discharge by the HMO.53  The baby exhibited signs of illness soon after
discharge; neither the physician nor the HMO responded to the family’s urgent requests for medical
care, including home visitation by an HMO nurse under its advertised “L’il Appleseed” program for
newborns.  The plaintiff, among other matters, directly challenged as negligent the HMO’s use of a
presumptive 24-hour discharge policy as a general treatment standard and without an individualized
decision.  In effect, at least one count of the complaint in effect directly challenged the
appropriateness of the company’s coverage standards.
Nonetheless, the court refused to dismiss this claim:
As an administrator overseeing an ERISA plan, an HMO will have administrative
responsibilities over the elements of the plan, including determining eligibility for benefits, calculating
those benefits, disbursing them to the participant, monitoring available funds, and keeping records. As
we held in Dukes, claims that fall within the essence of the administrator’s activities in this regard fall
within [ERISA’s civil action provisions] and are completely preempted.  In contrast, * * * when the
HMO acts under the ERISA plan as a health plan provider, it arranges and provides medical
treatment, directly or through contracts with hospitals, doctors or nurses.  In performing these
activities, the HMO is not acting in its capacity as a plan administrator but as a provider of health care,
subject to the prevailing standard of care.54
                                      
51 Moscovitch, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 80-82.
52 193 F. 3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999).
53 The facts of this case arose before the 1996 enactment by Congress of the Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection
Act, Pub. L. 104-204, which amends ERISA to prohibit the use of automatic 24-hour discharge policies.
54 In re U. S. Healthcare, 193 F. 3d at 162.
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In re U.S. Healthcare can be seen as the full realization of the import of the modern American
medical system in an ERISA context.  As a practical matter, the old insurance/health provider
distinction no longer exists.  Whether loosely or tightly organized, the modern American health care
company sells health care; in an ERISA context, it also sells administrative services.  But these
administrative services assume a subsidiary position in the view of the Third Circuit when the issue
is the treatment being provided rather than recordkeeping, eligibility determination, or benefit
payment matters.  In effect, In re U.S. Healthcare makes the coverage/quality distinction moot in a
managed care context.  Once the facts of a case are grounded in medical treatment, the company’s
conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff is integral to treatment, and the proper analytic framework is
malpractice, not insurance coverage decision-making.
Conclusion and Implications
Several major conclusions can be drawn from the cases to date.
First, given the strong public opinion in favor of retaining individual rights against managed
care companies operating under ERISA plans, as well as the more self-interested desire to avoid
cases if possible, it is possible that federal courts around the country may follow the lead of the
Third Circuit in its latest ERISA case, just as they did following the Dukes decision.  In cases
involving challenges to the quality of the treatment standards and procedures used by managed care
companies, courts increasingly may view these actions as extensions of the company’s role as a
treating health care provider rather than as a plan administrator that makes coverage decisions.  This
is particularly the case where the named defendant is the HMO or prime managed care intermediary
rather than a utilization management firm, as in Corcoran.
Second, where employers self-insure and buy administrative services from HMOs and other
managed care entities, the employers may themselves face vicarious liability claims.  As with any
other vicarious liability claim, the resolution of such a claim against an employer will turn on
whether the facts support a conclusion that the employer retained control over the conduct of the
company.  At least in those cases where self-insuring employers act as their own ERISA fiduciary
and thus retain the right to make ultimate decisions regarding whether or not treatment will be
furnished, the evidence of control is very strong.  Congress could of course choose to limit
exposure, even where employers retain control over treatment decisions.
Third, the Dukes case, as important as it is, also makes clear that if an employer and an
insurer contract for a certain standard of care, then courts may in fact be bound to honor such an
agreement as consistent with the enormous discretion that employers have under ERISA to design
their own benefit plans.  In fact, such a case already has occurred.  In Jones v The Kodak Medical
Assistance Plan,55 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed a challenge to
denial of appropriate treatment for an addiction disorder on the grounds that even though the
application of the plan’s treatment standards was, by the admission of the plan’s own consultant,
inappropriate in the plaintiff’s case, the treatment guidelines in use were part of the plan documents
themselves and thus completely unreviewable.56  In other words, the court found nothing wrong
with a company that decided to write possibly substandard treatment guidelines into its plan.57
                                      
55 169 F. 3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1999).
56 According to the court, the guidelines were a matter of plan design and structure,
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The implications of the Kodak case for employee rights are profound.  To the extent that
managed care companies include their treatment guidelines in their contracts with employers, their
treatment decisions could all be “boot-strapped” into the plan itself and thus shielded from review
entirely – not just under state law but under ERISA itself.  The right to contest a denial of coverage
under ERISA applies only for benefits under the plan.  As the court in Dukes suggested, where a
benefit under the plan is not merely care, but care of a certain standard, the care in essence becomes
unreviewable.  It may be that an employer or health care company that contracted for substandard
care could in certain circumstances be charged with violation of ERISA’s fiduciary standards, but
such a charge would not carry recovery of damages, as the Supreme Court’s decision in Pilot Life
indicates.
A fourth issue that is still unresolved is what happens in cases in which physicians, hospitals,
and other health providers that are members of networks are given the discretion under their
capitation agreements to in effect make resource allocation decisions on the company’s behalf.  The
Third Circuit decisions suggest that regardless of the tasks with which they are charged, providers
making treatment decisions should be viewed as providers, not plan administrators.  But a major
case now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Herdrich v Pegram,58 concerns the situations under
which physicians will be regarded as plan fiduciaries under ERISA.  Since the essence of a fiduciary’s
job under ERISA is to conserve trust benefits for the good of the group, it is not clear whether
viewed as fiduciaries, doctors do not acquire a shield from liability for actions that viewed in another
light would be considered malpractice.
The final set of implications concerns legislative reform efforts at the federal and state levels.
The House-passed managed care quality bill would reinstate state law in the case of liability for
managed care coverage decisions.59  As such, the bill would in effect overturn the Pilot Life case
insofar as the Supreme Court held that state law claims are preempted by ERISA when applied to
managed care company coverage decisions.  In effect, states that enact such laws (and Congress in
refraining from preempting such laws) are electing to preserve a distinction that courts may be on
the verge of eliminating, at least in a managed care context.  How such a decision to retain this
distinction will affect the decision by other courts to follow the lead of the Third Circuit in getting
rid of it cannot be known.
The bottom line for the time being is that taken together, the evolving line of ERISA
coverage/quality cases suggests that courts are increasingly willing to view HMO and managed care
conduct in a provider/treatment light.  To the extent that employers and companies do not contract
for care of a certain quality, this means that companies (and even employers in certain cases) may be
                                                                                                                          
rather than plan implementation, and as a result could not be reviewed since courts must enforce a plan “as written” unless
it violates a specific ERISA provision.  Id. (citing Averhart v U.S. West Management Pension Plan, 46 F.3d 1480, 1488 (10th
Cir. 1994) and Hein v Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 88 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Because an employer may draft a
benefits plan any way it wishes—indeed, ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits or
even any benefits at all—the employer does not act as a fiduciary when it sets the terms of the plan.
57 The court also found that there was no breach of ERISA disclosure requirements even though the guidelines were not
revealed to participants.
58  154 F. 3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh. den. 170 F. 3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 120 S. Ct. 10 (Sept. 28, 1999).
59 H.R. 2990 (106th Cong., 1st Sess.).  As of April 5, 2000, a joint Senate-House conference committee was still
attempting to reach agreement on various components of H.R. 2990 and S.1344, the Senate-passed version of a
“Patients’ Bill of Rights”.
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liable for damages under malpractice theory when their care falls below the standard of care in a
particular area.  This makes efforts to develop and refine a proper standard of care -- and to apply it
and rigorously oversee it in a managed care context -- of enormous importance.
